NYLS Law Review
Volume 55
Issue 2 Good Faith After Disney

Article 11

January 2011

Deconstructing Lyondell: Reconstructing Revlon
Lawrence Lederman
New York Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Law and
Economics Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons

Recommended Citation
Lawrence Lederman, Deconstructing Lyondell: Reconstructing Revlon, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 639
(2010-2011).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
Lawrence Lederman

Deconstructing Lyondell: Reconstructing
Revlon

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Lawrence Lederman is a Distinguished Adjunct Professor of Law at New York
Law School and a retired partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, where he was Chairman of the
firm’s Global Corporate Practice. This article was first presented on November 13, 2009 as a paper at New
York Law School’s symposium on good faith called The Delaware Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith After Disney:
Meaning ful or Mickey Mouse. This is one of a series of articles on the work of the Delaware courts by Professor
Lederman. See Disney Examined: A Case Study in Corporate Governance and CEO Succession, 52 N.Y.L. Sch.
L. Rev. 557 (2007–08).

639

Deconstructing Lyondell: Reconstructing Revlon
I.	INTRODUCTION

Delaware takeover law is bounded by two bedrock rules: (1) in the purchase or
sale of a company, independent directors’ decisions are protected by the business
judgment rule, unless the directors acted in bad faith; and (2) in a sale, all selling
directors are obligated to seek and obtain the best price for their shareholders. These
two rules are the products of two leading cases: Smith v. Van Gorkom1 and Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc.2 Van Gorkom was a misstep, corrected by
the Delaware legislature.3 Revlon was judicially constructed from a fierce takeover
battle in which one bidder was favored over another.4
These rules are simply stated, readily understandable by directors and shareholders,
and the protections afforded actions taken in good faith have the force of moral
imperatives.5 Both rules were both fully enunciated by 19866 and have been explicated
1.

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The court found that the board had not acted in an informed manner in the
sale of Trans Union, had been grossly negligent in failing to inform itself of the value of Trans Union,
and thus was not entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule. Id. at 874. The novelty of the
case was that the board was independent and without financial interest in the outcome of the sale and
the directors were all experienced in business. See id. at 889, 895. This result disturbed the business and
legal communities.

2.

506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In the sale of Revlon, the court found that the Revlon directors had breached
their duty of care by agreeing to deal exclusively with one bidder and to grant cancellation fees to that
bidder, effectively ending an active auction for the company by Pantry Pride. Id. at 184–85. The court
effectively held that the board’s duty is to obtain the best price for the shareholders. See id. at 185. The
auction began as a hostile takeover by Pantry Pride, and Forstmann Little & Co. was the bidder favored by
management and the board. Id. at 175–76. In a level playing field, Pantry Pride paid $58 a share against
Forstmann’s best bid of $57.25. Id. at 178. The bidding started at $42 per share. See id. at 176, 181.

3.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporation Code was
enacted in 1985. It states in pertinent part that a Delaware corporation may adopt in its charter:
[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation
or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director,
provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i)
[f]or any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders;
(ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law.

Id. The effect of section 102(b)(7) was to eliminate the duty of care in actions against directors for
money damages. Id. Following its enactment, charter provisions of Delaware corporations were
universally amended to eliminate such liability to the extent permitted by the statute.
4.

Revlon’s so-called “best price rule” also applies when there is only one bidder, and then becomes processoriented. The distinction to be drawn here is between substance and process. Process involves the steps
taken to prepare to make a decision. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporations and Other
Business Organizations 562 (9th ed. 2005). In this case, the decision was as to the value of the
company to be sold.

5.

In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), is the seminal case
setting out directors’ oversight duties. Chancellor Allen raises the protection of the business judgment
of independent directors from a “mere” judge-made rule to a moral imperative. “Indeed, one wonders on
what moral basis might shareholders attack a good faith business decision as ‘unreasonable’ or ‘irrational.’”
Id. at 968.

6.

See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
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through cases too numerous to count over practically two-and-a-half decades of
global corporate mergers that have recast the size and scope of corporate enterprises.
There is some inherent tension between these two rules, but it was not readily
noticeable until Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Walter E. Ryan, Jr.7 Lyondell arises as a case
because of the legislative overruling of Van Gorkom and is the counterpart to Van
Gorkom, both factually (the sale of the company by the CEO) and intellectually
(questionable knowledge of the value of the business by an independent board, not
motivated by self-interest). Logically, Lyondell (or a case like it) should have arisen
two or three months after the enactment of section 102(b)(7), raising the question of
the meaning of “good faith.”8 But it took almost twenty-five years for that question
to be brought to the Delaware Supreme Court.9
The delay probably comes from the fact that, after the enactment of section
102(b)(7), plaintiffs seeking damages consistently pleaded that directors acted in bad
faith, in lieu of claiming that the directors were grossly negligent,10 but absent selfdealing, the defense of good faith proved to be a formidable shield.11 Bad faith was
7.

970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). The Delaware Court of Chancery opinion is Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co.,
No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008). References in this article to Lyondell are
references to the Delaware Supreme Court opinion, unless otherwise noted. The tension is between the
requirement of excellence, obtaining the best price, and bad faith, the utter failure to act. The middle
ground is virtually excluded and the requirement of obtaining the best price (including setting up
procedures to do so) severely suffers.

8.

There is no statutory definition for the meaning of good faith. See infra note 11.

9.

Lyondell was heard as an interlocutory appeal from a motion to dismiss the complaint. Lyondell, 970
A.2d at 237. The appeal was granted to decide whether the case should continue with full-blown
discovery, followed by a trial. The Chancery Court had denied the interlocutory appeal, see Ryan, 2008
WL 2923427, at *24, but the Delaware Supreme Court took the case, obviously to truncate discovery
and the trial process. See Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 237.

10.

Such pleading was the only avenue open to plaintiffs. Good faith, however, is an affirmative defense. See
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223–24 (Del. 1999) (holding that “good faith” under
section 102(b)(7) as an affirmative defense must be pleaded by the defendant directors); see also McMullin
v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 926 n.79 (Del. 2000) (citing Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1223–24). The
definition of “good faith” was not worked out in these merger cases, showing that it rarely, if ever, got
that far. See infra note 11.

11.

The first definitional case was In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006), which
was about executive compensation, i.e., the hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz. Id. at 35. The element of
“intent,” which the Disney case used to distinguish gross negligence from bad faith was not enunciated
in merger cases. Instead, in the merger cases, bad faith was viewed as irrational acts or those beyond
reason. As Chancellor Allen observed in In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, CIV. A. No.
10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *13 n.13 (Del. Ch. 1989), “such limited substantive review as the rule
contemplates (i.e., is the judgment under review ‘egregious’ or ‘so beyond reason,’ etc.) really is a way of
inferring bad faith” (citations omitted). The Delaware Supreme Court equated irrationality with bad
faith. In Parnes v. Bally Entertainment Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999), the Delaware Supreme
Court said that “the presumptive validity of a business judgment is rebutted in those rare cases where
the decision under attack is ‘so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially
inexplicable on any grounds other than bad faith.’” Id. at 1246 (quoting In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc.
542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del Ch. 1988)); see also Gagliardi v. Tri Foods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (commenting on the formidable shield against damages that the good faith defense provides
to directors). Chancellor Allen stated, “There is a theoretical exception . . . that holds that some decisions
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equated with irrationality, which may be impossible for a plaintiff to prove. There
has been lengthy litigation over allegations of bad faith, but directors were advanced
their defense costs and ultimately prevailed.12
The chancery court opinion in Lyondell is the first case to address bad faith after
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation13 in the merger context. Plaintiffs sought
to use claims of bad faith as a newly honed sword to explore bad faith in the context
of Revlon duties, opening up settled law in the guise of a fresh approach to director
liability. The Delaware Supreme Court saw the threat to directors and blunted the
sword, holding in Lyondell, that independent directors are not liable and there are no
actionable claims against them in the sale of a company, unless the plaintiffs plead
with particularity the basis for showing that “those [independent] directors utterly
failed to obtain the best sale price.”14 The Delaware Supreme Court in Lyondell
effectively truncated the litigation process to avoid a full trial in which the defense of
good faith would be heard.
The Lyondell decision is totally process-oriented. It seeks and requires judicial
economy, e.g., the avoidance of full-blown trials. Indeed, it sets up the basis for
dismissal at the pleading stage prior to discovery. As such, it bares the tension
between the insulation of business judgment and the judicial scrutiny of director
implementation of the Revlon best price rule in cases where the plaintiffs seek
damages. In so doing, it eviscerates the Revlon best price rule with respect to all
damage claims and orphans the numerous damage cases decided over twenty-five
years that dealt with the duty of directors to get the best price for their shareholders
in a sale.
Lyondell is a sea change, as recognized in Police & Fire Retirement Systems of Detroit
v. Bernal, where the court states that, after Lyondell, “the shareholders’ only realistic
remedy for certain breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a sale of the control
transaction may be injunctive relief.”15 Until Lyondell, directors and shareholders
understood that, unlike the business judgment rule (which precludes examination of
directors’ decision making process), Revlon required judicial scrutiny of the
reasonableness of the board’s decisions and process.16 In other words, pre-Lyondell,
may be so ‘egregious’ that liability for losses they cause may follow even in the absence of proof of
conflict of interest or improper motivation. The exception, however, has resulted in no awards of money
judgments.” Id. at 1051–52.
12.

See, e.g., Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052.

13.

906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).

14.

Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 244. From this holding, mere conclusory statements of bad faith will not suffice.
The words “utter failure” were first used by Chancellor Allen in Caremark in defining and the limiting
liability of directors in oversight cases. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971
(Del. Ch. 1996). Oversight cases are the most difficult cases for plaintiffs to prevail, according to
Chancellor Allen. See id.

15.

Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. Bernal, No. 4663-CC, 2009 WL 1873144, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 26,
2009).

16.

See In re Netsmart Technologies, Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007). Vice Chancellor
Strine states: “Although linguistically not obvious, this reasonableness review is more searching than
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damage claims would be entertained, discovery allowed, and trials permitted to
explore the sale process, including the board’s choices.
Lyondell is best understood as expressive of Delaware’s commitment to the
insulation of independent directors from liability in connection with the sales
process.17 Directors are assured that they will not face draconian liability or have to
defend themselves against bad faith claims, unless their conduct “utterly failed.”18
What is missing in Lyondell is an expression of appropriate conduct for directors,
leaving us with the thought that any feeble or fumbling effort will not constitute an
“utter failure.” Worse, Lyondell rides roughshod over the expression of the various
modes of acceptable conduct, a range of conduct tested in innumerable situations
over twenty-five years. Revlon is the most flexible of rules: the board’s duty is to
obtain the best price in a sale, which can range from an auction for all comers to the
selection of one bidder, without a market test, depending on the board’s reasons and
the reasonableness of the board’s actions.19 No claims, other than claims of an utter
failure, will now be actionable for damages.
Revlon is too important to be left in ruins. Revlon must be reconstructed so that
injunctions are not the only prescriptive basis in which to monitor the reasonableness
of directors charged with the duty to get the best price. Indeed, injunctions may be
helpful, but they are disruptive and difficult to obtain in the middle of the action
because courts are truly put in the position of second-guessing directors’ business
decisions.20 Moreover, the threat of damage claims helps focus the board on fulfilling
its duties.
The easy Revlon cases are those in which there are competing bidders. Under
Revlon, the board cannot favor one bidder over another. Favoritism is easy to detect.
And indifference, even a stupor, will promote shareholders’ interests where
competition is robust. Indeed, in a bidding war, the board should get out of the way
and not change any rules in the middle of the contest, unless a change in the rules
unequivocally promotes the bidding contest without detriment to any one bidder.
rationality review, and there is less tolerance for slack by the directors.” Id. at 192. NetSmart is an
injunction case, which puts Strine in the position of correcting director behavior. His observation about
“less tolerance for slack” also bares some of these conflicts with the business judgment rule. See id. The
business judgment rule as modified by section 102(b)(7) is the predominant rule, but that should not
mean that the rule of Revlon asserts little or no influence.
17.

This commitment is enunciated in section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporation Code. See Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); see, e.g., Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit, 2009 WL 1873144.

18.

See Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 244. Revlon duties are now equated with oversight duties, subject to the “utter
failure” standard. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

19.

See In re Amsted Indus. Inc. Litig., No. 8224, 1988 WL 92736 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1988) (the leading
case holding that alternatives to auction procedures are acceptable).

20. That is, unless the chancery court changes the standards for injunctive relief because no damage remedy

is available. See Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit, 2009 WL 1873144, at *6. Injunctive cases require fast
and immediate action, which is a stress on the judicial system and not always the best way to decide
complex issues where the board has latitude. The board is directly involved in merger situations and the
involvement is meant to be more “hands on” than in matters of (standard or typical) business operations,
the ordinary subject of the oversight cases.
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The situation where there is only one bidder at the outset, and no other bidder
surfaces during the process, is a different matter. Here, the board must act with care
and promote readily available options for other bidders to intervene at any stage of
the process. The real question would be whether the board’s actions intentionally
impaired the process by discouraging competing bids. This is quite different from
looking at whether there has been an “utter failure.” There are a significant number
of cases in which the process was intentionally impaired.21
This article will address the reasons for the Lyondell holding, deconstructing the
case and then attempting to reconstitute (reconstruct) Revlon, which has needed
careful review for a long time. There has been an inordinate insensitivity to the role
of lock-ups22 in the sales process, clearly evident in Lyondell. Indeed, Lyondell has
made the sales process opaque rather than transparent, and has not promoted clear
directives of acceptable behavior for directors. 23 Accordingly, Part II of this article,
Lyondell Deconstructed, will present the Lyondell case in detail, relying on the factfinding of the Delaware Chancery Court. This Part also examines the review of the
board’s decision-making process by the Delaware Supreme Court, focusing on the
facts considered important by the court, noting the facts ignored, and, in effect,
deconstructing the case. Also in Part II, Van Gorkom, the earlier case where issues of
bid price were central to the opinion, will be considered to show how Van Gorkom
prompted the best price rule of Revlon. From this analysis, which explores the tension
between Lyondell and Revlon, Part III, Reconstructing Revlon, will discuss the
development of the Revlon rule over the past twenty-five years, particularly the
development of the rules dealing with lock-ups, which sometimes promote and often
hinder realization of the best price. In Part III, the rationale for lock-ups as part of
the sales process is explored.
The thesis of this article, explained in Part III, is that the standardization of
certain forms of lock-ups have rendered the pursuit of the best price difficult and
filled the process with needless pitfalls. It is the negotiation of lock-ups that appeared
to preclude other bidders and thus prompted the Delaware Court of Chancery in
Lyondell to opt for a full trial to explore the sales process. In Part III, I propose
adjustments and simplifications to lock-ups and encourage the early distribution of
company valuation materials, namely earnings projections. Early distribution of
21.

See, e.g., In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d 171 (injunction granted for failure to canvass industry bidders). See
also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009), as a variation on the theme of protecting the
management’s interests where insiders favored a recapitalization over an outright sale. Independent
directors may often favor one set of bidders over another or try to assure the first bidder that the deal
will be done because the management favors one bidder over the other, although the directors have no
economic stake in the outcome. This is impermissible.

22.

For a definition of lock-ups, see infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.

23.

Part of the difficulty the chancery court had in dealing with the Revlon requirement of the best price
was the effect of the lock-ups. See Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427
(Del. Ch. July 29, 2008). The Delaware Chancery Court notes that plaintiff complains that the deal
protection devices “essentially ‘locked up’ this transaction” and the court denied the defendants’
summary judgment to examine the lock-up. Id. at *3 n.11 and accompanying text. The Lyondell Supreme
Court opinion did not address the lock-ups.
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projections will promote both transparency and the Lyondell imperative of judicial
efficiency, while enhancing the board’s ability to obtain the best price in a sale of
control.
II. LYONDELL DECONSTRUCTED

Lyondell and Van Gorkom are factually similar cases. This is no surprise, although
twenty-five years separate them. We like to think that boards have grown more
knowledgeable and the marketplace more sophisticated over the years. But all that
has changed is the size of the deals, not the human motivations behind the deals.24
Both Trans Union and Lyondell were controlled by imperial CEOs who demanded a
compliant board. Jerome Van Gorkom, the CEO of Trans Union, chose to sell his
company to Jay Pritzker (the head of a vast, privately held corporate empire) because
Van Gorkom was of retirement age and was seeking a considerable premium for his
stock. In addition, Trans Union, a public company, was no longer able to benefit
from the investment tax credit on its equipment purchase of railcars.25 An inability to
use this credit would render Trans Union non-competitive and decrease its stock
price.26 Pritzker was seeking the company’s steady cash flow and could utilize the
investment tax credit to shelter the company’s income. 27
The men shook hands on a deal, including a lock-up—in this case, a stock option,
the most potent of lock-ups. 28 Both men were consummate deal makers and
considered their word to be their bond. Van Gorkom then presented the deal to the
board, with only hours to act. 29 The board accepted Van Gorkom’s assurances of
value, without independent verification or discussion. Van Gorkom delivered the
company to Pritzker at the agreed-upon price of $55 per share, despite the interest of
Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR) at $60 per share.30 The fact that there was
an opportunity for a possible higher price, which was discouraged, inflamed members
of the Delaware Supreme Court and resulted in a 3-2 decision holding the independent
directors personally liable for blindly following Van Gorkom’s recommendation. 31
24.

Van Gorkom, involving the sale of Trans Union, was approximately a $750 million transaction. See Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 866–67 (Del. 1985). Lyondell was a $13 billion transaction. Lyondell Chem.
Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 2009). The deal dynamics at work were the same, as will be noted.

25.

See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.

26. See id. at 864–65.
27.

See id. at 864–66.

28. In practice, the potency of the stock option resides in the fact that at the time of grant it usually contains

a spread between the exercise price (often the pre-merger trading price) and the deal price at the time of
announcement, usually a 20% or more premium on the pre-merger announcement trading price. If a
competing bidder then offers more than the deal price, the value of the option increases. This spread
and the increase effectively discourage the competing bidder.

29. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867–68.
30. Id. at 868–69, 884.
31.

Id. at 874, 893. KKR needed certain members of the management to agree to continue in the business.
Van Gorkom discouraged a key manager from making such a commitment. Id. at 885.
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Dan F. Smith, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Lyondell, chose to sell
Lyondell to Leonard Blavatnik, the Chairman of Access, a private holding company
that was the parent company of Basell, a Luxembourg company and a “global leader
in polyolefin technology, production, and marketing.”32 Smith’s motives were more
complex than Van Gorkom’s because he probably did not intend to retire at the time
Blavatnik, through Access, purchased an 8.3% stake in Lyondell held by Occidental.33
But at the moment of Access’s Schedule 13D filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to report its purchase of the Occidental block, it was clear that
Lyondell was in play and Smith could lose control. Indeed, shortly after Access filed
its Schedule 13D—within three days—Apollo Management, a private equity group
(a counterpart to KKR, then known as a leveraged buy-out firm), approached Smith
to sponsor a management-led leveraged buyout of Lyondell. Smith “flatly rebuffed”
Apollo.34 The nominal reason was a conflict of interest. More apparent was the fact
that Smith was deleveraging Lyondell and probably did not want to run a highly
leveraged company when he was of retirement age because changes in the economy
could result in severe losses, which would reduce the value of the company and his
nest egg.35 This conservatism was sound. The leveraged Lyondell ultimately filed for
bankruptcy.36
Smith immediately approached Blavatnik after the 13D filing, much the same
way Van Gorkom approached Pritzker, deal-maker to deal-maker. Smith insisted on
$48 per share. Blavatnik countered with lesser numbers, but Smith told him that
nothing less than $48 would get his recommendation or the board’s approval,
although he had not spoken to the Lyondell board.37 Blavatnik met the bid and
insisted on an array of lock-ups, including a 3% break-up fee of $400 million, and
assured Smith that the financing was fully in place. 38 The two men agreed.
On July 10, 2007, Smith then took the deal to the board and told the members, as
Van Gorkom had similarly told his board, that there were only a few days to make the
decision.39 Although this was the first time that the board had heard of the deal, the
time constraints were real. Blavatnik had entered into a deal to buy Huntsman
Chemical in June and Apollo had intervened and placed a superior bid on the table on
July 4.40 Blavatnik had to counter or terminate the contract with Huntsman Chemical.
32.

See Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 29,
2008).

33.

Id. at *4 n.17 and accompanying text; see Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866 (“It is noteworthy in this
connection that he [Van Gorkom] was then approaching 65 years of age and mandatory retirement.”).

34. See Ryan, 2008 WL 2923427, at *5 n.21 and accompanying text.
35.

See id. at *6 nn.25–27 and accompanying text.

36. See Chemical Unit Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 2009, at B4.
37.

See Ryan, 2008 WL 2923427, at *5–6.

38. Id. at *6, 8.
39.

See id. at *6–8 nn.29–41 and accompanying text.

40. Id. at *6.
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Blavatnik agreed to the $48 price for Lyondell at the end of the day on July 9 and
asked for a firm commitment from the Lyondell board by the end of the day on July
11 to meet his deadline to drop or raise his bid for Huntsman Chemical.41
The Lyondell board gave Blavatnik his asked-for assurances of the acceptability
of the $48 per share price. Thereafter, the board attempted some renegotiation
through Smith as their negotiator, but Blavatnik made only cosmetic adjustments to
his offer. Indeed, Blavatnik told Smith that they had a deal on price and terms, and
that he should stick to it. The agreement with Smith and the board’s assurances had
given Blavatnik the high moral ground, and Smith told the board there was no
movement and the deal was too good to lose.42 This “too good to lose” refrain, also
used by Van Gorkom, was the threat of liability to shareholders for rejecting a very
good deal.43 The Lyondell board’s actions and decisions took place over a seven-day
period in which an investment banking firm was hired to pass on the fairness of the
price. On July 16, 2007, the board adhered to its forty-five minute decision on July
11 to give Blavatnik a prompt, definitive agreement.44 Nonetheless, it is difficult to
fault the board. The board believed that it acted responsively and responsibly to the
constraints of the deal presented and that it received a good price. When presented
with the deal, the board followed the well-trod path set out by Revlon and its progeny,
of bringing in an investment bank and obtaining a fairness opinion.
The class action complaint of the Lyondell shareholders alleged that the directors
had breached their duty of care, loyalty, and candor and put their personal interests
ahead of the shareholders. The Delaware Court of Chancery rejected all claims,
except those directed at the process by which the directors agreed to sell the company
and the use of deal protection provisions in the merger agreement.45 The chancery
court saw indolence in the board’s actions because of the decision of the board to
“wait and see” in May, after the 13D filing by Access and Smith’s presentation to the
board on July 10 of a $48 per share offer.46 The Delaware Supreme Court rightly
corrected the chancery court by noting that the Revlon rule, the best price rule, did
not become operative until the board decided to sell the company in July.47 The
chancery court was disturbed by the board’s inaction until then, but the failure was
41.

Id.

42.

See id. at *7–8. Smith would walk away on the closing of the deal with a payout of close to $100 million,
including the benefit of a significant acceleration of stock options, triggered by the sale, providing him
with a significant retirement package. He was motivated to get a high price, once he chose to sell, but he
wanted to pick his buyer, as the rejection of Apollo shows. There were allegations that he would continue
as CEO of Lyondell. See Lyondell Chemical Co., Definitive Proxy Solicitation Material, Merger or
Acquisition 41 (Form DEFM14A) (Schedule 14A) (Oct. 12, 2007). The Chancery Court points out that
the vesting of options “does not create a per se impermissible interest in the transaction.” See Ryan, 2008
WL 2923427, at *10 n.53 and accompanying text. But it shines a light on Smith’s behavior.

43.

See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 868–69 (Del. 1985).

44. See Ryan, 2008 WL 2923427, at *7–8.
45.

See id. at *3, 11.

46. See id. at *5–6, 12–14.
47.

See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 241–44 (Del. 2009).
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on the part of Smith, e.g., not telling his board of his negotiations with Blavatnik.48
And that failure was not raised by the plaintiffs in the case as an independent claim
against Smith.49 The board’s failure to satisfy its Revlon duty was its reliance on the
CEO, which is understandable human error, correctable by the courts by pointedly
disapproving of such behavior. If there was a single missed opportunity in the
supreme court opinion, it was the court’s failure to chastise the board for relying on
the CEO as the negotiator after it learned of the $48 deal, the obvious product of
secret negotiations.
The failure of this case is not only about the human error of choosing the wrong
negotiator. It is structural as well, and goes to the systematic insensitivity on the part
of the Delaware courts to acknowledge the impediments to best price realization
posed by deal lock-ups50 and the necessity of access to valuation information, mainly
company projections of earnings, to allow the bidding process to freely and properly
function.
First, as to valuation information,51 Wall Street had the following information
for Lyondell based on reported earnings: the discounted cash flow showed a range of
value between $30 and $39 per share; a leveraged buyout (LBO) analysis showed a
range of value between $32.25 and $38.50 per share. The Wall Street information
was the information in the public filings of Lyondell with the SEC.52 On the other
hand, Lyondell management and the board had much more robust information as to
the company’s value based on Lyondell’s business plans and projections. These
numbers showed discounted cash f low values ranging between $37 and $47 per
share, and an LBO analysis of values ranging between $44.75 and $51.50 per share,
and liquidation values of about $58.50 per share.53
The $48 price per share that Smith sought from Blavatnik is about the mid-point
in Smith’s LBO value analysis and was obviously made available to Blavatnik in the
negotiations. No other putative acquirer had such valuation information, and as a
result, the $48 bid, a 45% premium over the unaffected Lyondell trading price, had
to appear to outsiders to be on the high side given the Wall Street information, a
blow-out price. The chancery court comments on this apparent disconnect between
appearance and reality in the first paragraph of the opinion, appropriately so, this

48. See Ryan, 2008 WL 2923427, at *5, 12–16.
49. Compare id. at *10 n.59 (stating that the plaintiff did not challenge the directors’ independence from Smith

and thus the court concluding that “it is not necessary to consider in any detail whether Smith’s personal
financial interest . . . amounted to a breach of his duty of loyalty”; and going on further to state that the ten
independent directors, independent from Smith, were solely responsible for the decision and dismissed the
duty of loyalty claims), with Lawrence Lederman, Disney Examined: A Case Study in Corporate Governance
and CEO Succession, 52 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 557, 579–81 (2007–08).

50. For a definition of lock-ups and a discussion of their use, see infra notes 74–80 and accompanying text.
51.

The valuation information is reported in Ryan, 2008 WL 2923427, at *8.

52.

See id.

53.

See id.
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being a Revlon case about obtaining the best price.54 In other words, the ball was
hidden from all of the other possible players.55
This lack of information was a real impediment to the bidding process, but would
not be necessarily fatal, if not for the break-up fee, which was preclusive but appeared
to be well within the Revlon parameters. The break-up fee was $385 million on a $13
billion deal, about 3%.56 Compare this to the Huntsman deal where Blavatnik had
negotiated a $200 million break-up fee on a $10 billion deal, or less than 2%.57 There
is an apparent reason for the difference. The Huntsman family was personally, heavily
invested in the deal and did not want to preclude topping bids. The strategy worked,
as shown by Apollo’s bid. Blavatnik learned his lesson from that Apollo bid and
pushed it to the limits in Lyondell, seeking a $400 million break-up fee. Blavatnik
now sought to preclude others from bidding.
In Blavatnik’s favor then, against other putative bidders, was the $385 million
break-up fee, plus the benefit of the 8.3 million shares he had purchased from
Occidental.58 Those shares were purchased at a substantial discount to his offer price
for Lyondell and had a built-in gain of, conservatively, $200 million.59 In addition,
Blavatnik benefitted from the $200 million in break-up fees from Huntsman, a total
of $800 million or $3.20 a share on the Lyondell stock.
The powerful effect of this money is easy to see, if you attempt to game the
bidding process for Lyondell and look at the way the potential players had to look at
the contest. A decent overbid would be $50 per share, if the players all had the same
information, which was the high end of Lyondell’s LBO value. A $49 bid is weak
and allows Blavatnik to bid $50, which would probably be the winning bid. For the
challenger, it is best to go directly to $50 per share, if that is your best bid, rather
than bid at all and lose the company. A $50 bid would force Blavatnik to pay more
than $50, e.g., $51, the top end of a projected purchase price. Such a bid would be
prohibitive, unless the deal is essential for corporate survival, which it would not be
in Lyondell’s case because Lyondell was a conglomeration of companies, not a pure
play in its industry with a commanding market position in any of its businesses. The
prospective bidder at $50 per share had to look at Blavatnik’s position before making
54. Id. at *1.
55.

The problem of lack of information is inherent in those situations in which a bidder is selected without
a so-called “market check,” the furnishing of valuation information to selected bidders. Such valuation
information becomes available, if at all, only at the time of the distribution of proxy material, months
after the deal has been signed, and by that time the time advantage discourages other bidders because
regulatory and financing hurdles have already been cleared. To then stop the music requires a very hefty
premium to overcome deal uncertainty. Paramount lost out to Warner because it had not received
antitrust approval at the time it decided to compete with Warner. The hefty price could not stop a deal
that was certain to close. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).

56. Ryan, 2008 WL 2923427, at *1.
57.

Id. at *7 n.33.

58. Id. at *4 n.17.
59.

See AI Chemical Investments LLC et al., General Statement of Beneficial Ownership (Schedule 13D)
(May 11, 2007), which shows Lyondell shares purchased at $32.1130 per share.
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a bid. Blavatnik, with his $3.20 per share advantage, could easily reach $51 and still
only be paying $48 per share. Considering such fire power, it would not make sense
to compete. If you do not count the gain on the 8.3% of the shares held by Blavatnik
or his $200 million break-up pay out from Huntsman, the $385 million break-up fee
is worth $1.50 per share. The potential bidder at $50 per share pays the cost of the
break-up fee and is, in reality, paying $51.50 a share, the absolute top of the LBO
value analysis. The air at such altitude is very rarified and would leave most bidders
breathless. This gaming analysis shows the reason that even a 3% break-up fee can,
on the margin, be preclusive to outside, competing bidders.60
Smith and the board knew of the preclusive effects of the break-up fee, along
with the non-public disclosure of the internal valuation of Lyondell. 61 The fee was in
the so-called “customary range.” The board could well understand that this break-up
fee was used to leverage Blavatnik into paying the mid-point of the range of value.
From Blavatnik, they extracted a “no financing out” clause, which means that
Blavatnik took the risk of obtaining financing and would have to pay a significant
termination fee (a so-called “reverse break-up fee”) if he wanted to terminate the
deal.62 These “reverse” fees have provoked litigation.63 And considering the amount
of the break-up fee, as well as the unavailability of valuation information to any other
potential bidders, Lyondell could not expect to see another bid from anyone in the
industry or from an LBO player.64
This brings us to a consideration of Revlon.65
III.	RECONSTRUCTING REVLON

Van Gorkom was a Revlon case before Revlon. The focal point in the Van Gorkom
case was the best price for shareholders. The legal issues posed were about the duty of
care, the process of getting to the best price, and whether the best price was obtained.
60. The plaintiff conceded that none of the deal protections “standing alone” were preclusive, but argued

that the cumulative effect was to preclude other bids. See Ryan, 2008 WL 2923427, at *16. The court
took the cumulative effect argument seriously and it was a basis for denying the board summary
judgment. See id.

61.

See id. at *6–7. The board tried to reduce the fee but Blavatnik resisted, and thus relied on the “blowout”
price. See id. at *7. Reflecting on the deal protections, despite the price, the chancery court observes
“maybe someone—a knowledgeable someone—had material doubts about whether the price itself would
scare off any potential poacher.” Id. at *17 n.103.

62. See id. at *6–7. The deal certainty, preclusive lock-ups, granted to Blavatnik required him to assure

Lyondell that there was also certainty of the deal closing; which meant “no financing outs” and a hefty
reverse break-up fee.

63. See, e.g., Hexicon Specialty Chems. Inc., v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008); United

Rentals, Inc. v. Ram Holdings. Inc. 937 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 2007). These cases show that reverse fees
are common and are meant to discourage buyers from walking away.

64. Apollo, which had shown early interest and had been rejected by Smith, was now fully engaged with the

Huntsman acquisition. See Ryan, 2008 WL 2923427, at *13. The break-up fee assured certainty of
outcome, that Blavatnik was the buyer.

65.

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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In other words: Had this board tested the market, understood the value of the company,
and acted diligently to allow an opportunity for a competing bid? The Delaware
legislature closed off the issues of care with the enactment of section 102(b)(7).66
In response, the Delaware Supreme Court announced the duty to obtain the best
price in Revlon the way courts always do, by insisting that it was inherent in the
fiduciary duties of directors, not based on the duty of care. What was new about
Revlon was that it opened up the ability of the courts to examine the reasonableness
of the sales process followed by directors.67 In a real sense, the Van Gorkom case was
a false start, or was declared such by the legislature, and Revlon was a brilliant
repositioning to deal with the same issues.
Revlon arose out of the hostile takeover bid for Revlon made by MacAndrews &
Forbes Holding, Inc. (through its subsidiary, Pantry Pride). The hostile bid was sharply
contested by Revlon, which first launched an exchange offer for its Senior Subordinated
Notes ($47.50 principal amount at 11.75% interest) for each share of Revlon, up to ten
million shares.68 The purpose of this self-tender was to leverage Revlon to the point
where it would cease to be attractive to the hostile bidder. That tactic, however, did not
work. In a brilliant financial move, Ronald O. Perelman, who controlled MacAndrews
& Forbes, lowered the price of his offer to account for the reduction in equity. The
Revlon board then sought a “white knight” in the form of the leveraged buy-out firm
Forstmann Little & Co. In the ensuing bidding contest between Forstmann and
Perelman, the court found that the Revlon directors had breached their duty of care by
agreeing to deal exclusively with one bidder and to grant cancellation fees to that bidder,
effectively ending an active auction for the company by Pantry Pride.69 The court held
that the board’s duty is to obtain the best price for its shareholders. The auction began
as a hostile takeover by Pantry Pride, but Forstmann Little Co., the so-called “white
knight,” was the bidder favored by management and the board. In a level playing field,
Pantry Pride ultimately paid $58 a share against Forstmann’s best bid of $57.25. The
bidding started at $42 per share.70
The Delaware Supreme Court insisted on a level playing field and no favoritism.
The board’s duty was to obtain the best price for its shareholders, without regard to
any other factors.71 The court was careful, as it developed the law, to say that the
66. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
67.

See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173. Revlon cleared the path to examine negotiations and valuations, rather
than solely defensive actions of directors enunciated in the Unocal takeover contest. Id. Unocal can be
read broadly to cover director actions in sales of company control, but Revlon, in more specific terms,
monitors such sales process. Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985),
with Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173.

68. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177.
69. See id. at 184–85.
70. See id. at 175, 179–80.
71.

Id. at 185.

[W]e must conclude that under all the circumstances the directors allowed considerations
other than the maximization of shareholder profit to affect their judgment, and followed
a course that ended the auction for Revlon, absent court intervention, to the ultimate
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process chosen to obtain the best price was up to the directors,72 but that the end
result of the process, or its sole purpose, was the best price, without favor to any
bidder.73
With such clarity, moral as well as legal, little should impair the board’s vision.
But lock-ups did, in fact, add a very confusing element that clouded transparency in
bidding contests. To understand the confusion, you have to ask three fundamental
questions about lock-ups: (1) What are they?; (2) How do they work?; and (3) Why
are they necessary?
Lock-ups are any device that impedes a competing bidder, such as stock options,
break-up fees, or agreements that allow the original bidder to force a merger vote by
the target’s shareholders or cause the seller to withhold material valuation information
about the company from other bidders.74 They are negotiated at the time the deal is
negotiated and they are demanded by the buyer to help preclude competing bids, in
essence, to “lock up” the deal. The buyer seeks to craft lock-ups as close to preclusive
as possible, and the seller uses the ability to grant such semi-preclusive arrangements
to facilitate its negotiations for the best price.75
Lock-ups first developed in the latter part of the 1970s at the time when the
merger market became active and investment banking firms had the ability to find a
competing bidder for a company subject to a hostile takeover within ten calendar
days.76 The awareness of a ready, highly competitive market for companies induced
buyers to seek lock-ups. Early lock-ups were draconian, such as crown jewel options,
which gave the buyer the right to purchase selected valuable assets of the seller at a
favorable price in the event a competing bid prevails. As a result, the competitor would
be able to buy the castle, but the crown jewels would be gone, taken by the original
bidder. Options on large blocks of stock were also used, to be purchased with a
subordinated note at a very favorable interest rate. The benefit of the stock option was
that, as the competitor raised the price for the target, the competitor ratcheted up the

Id.

detriment of its shareholders. No such defensive measure can be sustained when it
represents a breach of the directors’ fundamental duty of care. (citation omitted). In
that context the board’s action is not entitled to the deference accorded it by the business
judgment rule.

72. See In re Amsted Indus. Inc. Litig., No. 8224, 1988 WL 92736 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1988) (holding that

alternatives to auction procedures are acceptable).

73. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
74.

See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (discussing various types
of lock-ups); see also Jeffrey J. Haas, Corporate Finance in a Nutshell 460–67 (2004).

75. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 926–27, 930–33 (Del. 2003) (discussing

preclusion).

76. Ten calendar days was the required duration of a tender offer under the Williams Act, adopted in 1968,

and before that by the New York Stock Exchange for listed companies. The SEC amended the statutory
ten day period in 1980 when it adopted the first set of changes to the Williams Act and initiated the
twenty business day rule. Until 1980, so-called “white knights” were readily found and encouraged by
investment firms to launch a competing bid within ten calendar days. See 2 Thomas Lee Hazen,
Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 11.5(3)(B) 233 (4th ed. 2002).
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purchase price and gave the original buyer a huge windfall.77 Both of these kinds of
lock-ups were disapproved by the Delaware courts. Under Revlon, the courts began
regulating the kinds and the extent to which lock-ups could be granted.78
The courts examined lock-ups on a case-by-case basis, striking down lock-ups
that were deemed preclusive, and created in the process a comfort zone or safe harbor
for the various arrays of lock-ups utilized, including the piling up, one on top of
another, of the customary forms of lock-ups used in addition to break-up fees. A
break-up fee of 3% of the equity purchase price (exclusive of debt being assumed)
became a safe harbor out of this process and was used and approved in dozens of
cases by the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts.79 Indeed, in Lyondell the
Supreme Court did not quarrel with the lock-ups. They were so deceptively ordinary
as to not deserve or provoke comment.80
The question is: If the courts have to monitor lock-ups (and have chosen to do so)
in the sales process where the goal of the process is to obtain the best price, why
tolerate lock-ups?81 They add considerable costs and reduce the proceeds available to
shareholders. There is no doubt that the shareholders pay the cost of lock-ups and are
hurt by the failure to disseminate valuation information made available to a selected
bidder. If the lock-up precludes bidders (such as Apollo in Lyondell), it reduces the
price to shareholders. And if there is a competing bid, a lock-up reduces the amount
of that competing bid because all buyers have to calculate all potential costs layered
on the purchase price in making their bids. The conventional answer in support of
lock-ups is that buyers will not negotiate for the purchase, if the first buyer is merely
a stalking horse for other bidders. The buyer must cover its costs and also feel that
being first offers an advantage, otherwise the buyer will not play, e.g., by setting a
floor price. Stated succinctly, this conventional answer holds that if the courts were
to ban lock-ups, they would be discouraging an important economic activity that is
beneficial to shareholders. Indeed, in this line of argument, a 3% break-up fee is a
small price to pay for the merger premium being made available to shareholders.
This conventional answer is largely spurious. There may be good reason to cover
the buyer’s costs, even with a rule of thumb measure such as 1% of the equity purchase
price. But there is little evidence that there would not be a merger market without
77.

In practice, and in my professional experience, the stock options were not exercised. The competing
bidder would pay the “spread”—the difference between the exercise price and the purchase price for the
company—to the losing bidder.

78. See Paramount, 637 A.2d at 34.
79. See, e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch. 2000); Matador Capital Mgmt.

Corp. v. BRC Holdings, 729 A.2d 280, 291 n.15 (Del. Ch. 1998).

80. The ordinary or common nature of lock-ups is argued in Police & Fire Retirement System of Detroit v.

Bernal, No. 4663-CC, 2009 WL 1873144, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2009).

81.

The chancery court sees this case as arising from “the intersection of two fundamental tenets of
Delaware law,” an intersection of Revlon duties and the permissiveness of lock-ups as addressed in
Unocal and Omnicare. See Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, at
*2–3 nn.9–12 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008).
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lock-ups.82 Indeed, every hostile takeover is undertaken without any protections on
the part of the target as well as the hostile bidder, and necessarily invokes the search
for competing bidders who will be given access to the company’s most privileged
valuation information and generous break-up fees.83 Few believe that so-called “white
knights,” subsequent bidders, need the break-up fees to enter the bidding. The fee is
simply a leg up. But when the original hostile bidder wins, which is often enough,
the fee is a cost borne by the shareholders. Perhaps the fee for the original bidder
should be called the origination fee, which is a sound way of looking at it.
The competitive bidding process (including auctions) raises the one important
reason for lock-ups: to give the board control of the sale process. From this position,
the board can assure the selected bidder that the board will be able to reward the
bidder that follows the rules set out by the board. In other words, break-up fees and
lock-ups permit the board to control a bidding or auction process and reward the
bidder whose price has had some market test. The reward is definiteness of outcome,
that is, assurance that if the process is fully followed the anticipated deal will result.
This reason for tolerating, even promoting, the use of lock-ups requires refinement
because lock-ups are meant to impede further bidding and are a cost to stockholders.
Where the board has not marketed the company and has not held an auction in
which buyers compete, there is little reason to reward the bidder for more than its
expenses. If the bidder is open to this (and agrees to a marketing opportunity because
the bidder believes that it has offered a blow-out price, such as Blavatnik claimed in
Lyondell), then something like 1% of the equity as a break-up fee is justified. Where
the board conducts an auction and assures the competitors that the best price will be
selected, then a much larger break-up fee of 3%, 4%, or even 5% is justified because
the purpose of the auction is to get the best price at the auction, usually with sealed
bids to provoke the best price from the most aggressive bidder, and then drop the
hammer. After an active auction, the break-up fee is the hammer.
In other words, the bidder earns the lock-up. Where the first bidder is selected
and the board both believes that they have found the best buyer without a market
test, and wants to induce a bid, a small break-up fee, a fee under 1%, may be justified.
Seller (and possibly buyer) believes that the price will withstand competition or there
will be no competition and, as a result, there is no reason to grant more fees.84 The
small fee announces a negotiated transaction and does not place obstacles in the way
82. Indeed, the Lyondell board proposed a break-up fee of 1% during a “go shop” period in which Lyondell

could actively seek prospective buyers, but this approach was easily rejected because Smith had lost
negotiating leverage and the courts have approved 3% break-up fees in situations without “go shop”
provisions. See id. at *7.

83. The irony of Blavatnik’s break-up fee is that he initially positioned himself as a hostile bidder, upon

filing the Access 13D, and did not need a fee as inducement. His play in seeking the break-up fee was
to get a preclusive fee. If he had made a hostile bid without a break-up fee, his 8.3% stock advantage
would have justified the payment of a 3% fee to the competing bidder, to level the playing field. See id.
at *4–5. Different circumstances require the use of judgment.

84. There is also no reason to approve restrictions on dissemination of confidential valuation information to

bidders who sign confidentiality agreements, before or after they make a bid. Limiting information only
to so-called “superior bidders” requires bidders to take a leap of faith, which impairs the free market.
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of other potentially competing bids. If the buyer is open to a real market test, then a
higher fee (or intermediate fee) is justified. And where the buyer has offered the best
price in an auction, then the highest break-up fee is justified.
This change of emphasis, treating lock-ups as earned (and largely abusive where
there is no market check), sets an easy standard for the board to follow. The question
the board must answer is: Did the buyer earn the lock-up? Judgment may be called
into question, but if the question is addressed, then there is no basis for liability. The
Lyondell standard of “utter failure” to seek the best price can easily be addressed, as
can the question of whether the independent board intentionally impaired the
bidding process.85 Making the buyer earn the fee puts the power in the hands of the
board, which has the duty to get the best price. For too long, the lock-up has been
viewed as a consolation prize and not as an integral part of the sales process. A
graduated fee schedule gives the board the necessary instructions on promoting the
best price.
IV. CONCLUSION

Lyondell is expressive of the Delaware court’s commitment to the insulation of
independent directors from personal liability in connection with the sale of companies.
The case makes it extremely difficult to plead bad faith claims against directors
involved in the sales process, unless the plaintiff pleads facts showing an “utter failure”
to promote the best price in a sale. The “utter failure” standard equates the Revlon
best price standard with the oversight cases under Caremark, which is a regressive
development. What is missing in Lyondell is any expression of the appropriate conduct
for directors. The first missed opportunity was the failure to prohibit management
from taking the lead in the negotiation and sale of the company. The second was the
failure to address the role of lock-ups in the sale process, whether they are intentionally
being used to impair the sales process or to promote it. Valuation information is
important for competitive bidding, and break-up fees and restraints on the distribution
of such information severely inhibits the bidding process.86 In Lyondell, the break-up
fees were preclusive, considering both the value of the company known to the
marketplace and the amount of the break-up fee in relation to reasonable bids based
on that valuation information. The company’s projections showed that there was a
robust opportunity for an auction.87
The Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Lyondell forces an examination of
Revlon. If there are no defined duties that directors must satisfy, other than the
general obligation to get the best price for shareholders, and the directors cannot be
called to task with damages, then all the cases reviewing the reasonableness of the
85. See supra Part I.
86. The Lyondell board attempted to create an incentive in favor of shopping (and distributing valuation

information) by limiting the break-up fee before a shopping period to 1%. The proposal was rejected by
Blavatnik and there were no judicial constraints in the case law that would encourage the Lyondell
directors to insist on such a limiting approach. See Ryan, 2008 WL 2923427, at *7.

87.

See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
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sales processes that boards have engaged in for the last twenty-five years are basically
abandoned and the race-to-the-bottom accusations about the Delaware courts are
relevant and reinvigorated. The Delaware courts are common law courts working
within a statutory framework. In damage cases, they must re-examine Revlon. For
twenty-five years, they have tried to promote vigor in the sale of companies; now
vigor need not be shown, when any fumbling or feeble effort will suffice to avoid an
“utter failure.”
The best approach to Revlon is to examine those impediments (e.g., lock-ups and
dissemination of valuation information) to vigorous competition between bidders,
justified on the basis of promoting and directing competition for the benefit of
shareholders. Currently, break-up fees and other lock-ups are regarded as something
that the bidder demands to induce the bid. There are some costs to bidders being
first, but nothing justifies break-up fees regarded as “customary” when there has
been no market check. Out-of-pocket expenses may be appropriate, but little more,
and the withholding of valuation information disserves any claim that the directors
are subject to a duty to seek the best price. A change of the casual attitude towards
lock-ups has to be made, a change to require the bidder to earn the break-up fee and
put the board in the position of rewarding market-enhancing behavior which
promotes the best price for shareholders. This will mean a graduated fee schedule.
Such a schedule instructs the board on its role and will reinvigorate the sales process
under Revlon. It will also create standards against which “utter failure” can easily be
judged, placing the court in a position to determine whether the board intentionally
impaired the bidding process by withholding information or granting grossly
improvident lock-ups.
The most difficult situations that boards face are those in which they enter into a
definitive agreement with a bidder in which there has been no market check and there
is a disparity between the valuation information known to the company and known to
the market. In those cases, the board’s duty is to place no impediments on other
bidders—that is, with low break-up fees that are largely limited to expenses, and while
giving any bidder the right to seek and obtain the valuation information given to the
first bidder—and without complex limitations on what constitutes a superior bid. If
that baseline is achieved, Revlon will again be the vehicle for ensuring that directors
obtain the best price, expressive of directors’ duties in a sales situation.
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